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(16) Otherwise there would be room for only one record company, and only one record from it.

(17) In one of the historical senses of 'dialectical'. A debate can also be 'dialectical' in the other historical sense; for one side may defend both q and ~q. A related model is the *evidence model*, where one side is the evidence for p, the other the evidence for ~p.

(18) It is possible to define a (highly artificial) notion of content which makes *some* elements of such combinations of classical and cancellation views work, for instance thus: where A is analytic ct(A) = 0, and where A is not analytic ct(A) is defined in a standard way, e.g. in terms of consequences of A, or through the class situations where A does not hold. But then content loses its usual (normic) connections, e.g. the ties with consequence are severed, and the logical behaviour of content becomes highly irregular.
L. Goldstein persuaded us that some of Wittgenstein's early work involved a cancellation view.

(19) As explained in detail in [8],7.2. In effect the correspondence is also applied, in different ways, by Lorentzen and Hintikka, where the analogies with game theory are also exploited.

(20) There are some (hardly insuperable) problems in describing maximally consistent language-games.

(21) This sharp contrast, and double role for contradictions, is repeated in Hallett (p.221), again based partly on transitional work. Where propositions *say* something, describe something ([20],p.106), a contradiction is alarming. 'For there can be no contradiction in reality (i.e. T) our description must be wrong'. By contrast, contradictions need not be alarming in mathematics (in K-P). 'But mathematics is always a machine, a calculus. The calculus describes nothing. It can be applied to that to which it can be applied'.

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