

## Werk

**Label:** Article

**Jahr:** 1971

**PURL:** [https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?316342866\\_0012|log15](https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?316342866_0012|log15)

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ON INTERPRETABILITY IN SET THEORIES

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Denote by ZF the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (with regularity but without choice) and by GB the Gödel-Bernays set theory (the same restriction). Both theories are supposed to be formulated as formal systems with one sort of variables and one binary predicate  $\in$ . Every ZF-formula can be considered as a particular GB-formula by means of an obvious relative interpretation.

In a discussion with Professor G. Kreisel in summer 1969 I formulated the following

Problem: Does for every ZF-formula  $\varphi$  relative interpretability of  $(ZF, \varphi)$  in ZF imply relative interpretability of  $(GB, \varphi)$  in GB?

Denoting, for every theory  $T$  which is either an extension of ZF or an extension of GB, by  $J_T$  the set of all ZF-formulas such that  $(T, \varphi)$  is relatively interpretable in  $T$ , our problem reads: Is  $J_{ZF} \subseteq J_{GB}$ ?

We shall prove a theorem which implies the negative answer of our problem. The theorem also implies that  $J_{ZF}$  is not recursively enumerable (whereas  $J_{GB}$  is, which is easy to show). I discussed the problem with Professors G. Kreisel, J.R. Shoenfield and R. Solovay; I thank them for

their interest and for the encouraging advice to look for a counterexample. Discussions with my wife on her work [4] were not only an exciting pleasure for me but also helped me to find a solution.

First, let us recall some known facts on finitary relative consistency proofs useful in the sequel and yielding a background of our problem. Presupposed is the knowledge of the notion of a relative interpretation in the sense of Tarski [7] and some familiarity with Feferman's fundamental work [2].

Lemma 1. For every ZF-formula  $\varphi$ ,  $ZF \vdash \varphi$  iff  $GB \vdash \varphi$ ; equivalently, for every ZF-formula  $\varphi$ ,  $Con(ZF, \varphi)$  iff  $Con(GB, \varphi)$ .

See [6] for a finitary proof; in fact, Shoenfield constructs a primitive recursive function associating with every ZF-formula  $\varphi$  and every GB-proof of  $\varphi$  a ZF-proof of  $\varphi$ .

Although we shall be dealing with set theories, we shall explicitly use only variables ranging over the set of natural numbers; the letters  $x, y, \dots$  will be used for this purpose.  $\xi(x)$  is an arbitrary but fixed bi-numeration of the set of axioms of ZF in ZF. If  $\varphi$  is a ZF-formula then  $\xi \cup \{\bar{\varphi}\}$  means the formula  $\xi(x) \vee x \approx \bar{\varphi}$  which bi-numerates the axioms of  $(ZF, \varphi)$  in ZF.

Lemma 2. For each ZF-formula  $\varphi$ ,  $\varphi \in J_{ZF}$  iff  $ZF \vdash Con_{\xi \cup \{\bar{\varphi}\}} \pi$  for every  $\pi$ .

See [2] Theorem 8.10 (and also 6.3, 6.9 and 5.9) for the proof of the implication  $\Rightarrow$  (cf. also [5], foot-

note 22). The converse implication is easy to prove using reflexivity of  $(ZF, \varphi)$  and observing that

$$ZF \vdash [(Con_{\varphi \cup \{\varphi\}})^* \rightarrow Con_{\varphi \cup \{\varphi\}}]$$

( $*$  denotes the image of the respective formula in the interpretation in question).

Hence, having proved  $ZF \vdash Con_{\varphi \cup \{\varphi\}}$  for every  $m$ , we have the following: (i)  $(ZF, \varphi)$  is relatively interpretable in ZF, (ii) consequently,  $\varphi$  is relatively consistent w.r.t. ZF and (iii)  $\varphi$  is relatively consistent w.r.t. GB. But the question remains whether  $(GB, \varphi)$  is relatively interpretable in GB and we are led to our problem whether  $\mathcal{I}_{ZF} \subseteq \mathcal{I}_{GB}$ .

A counterexample is a ZF-formula  $\varphi$  such that  $(ZF, \varphi)$  is relatively interpretable in ZF, but  $(GB, \varphi)$  is not relatively interpretable in GB. Such a  $\varphi$  is consistent with GB, and also  $\neg \varphi$  is consistent with GB, for otherwise the identical interpretation of GB would be an interpretation of  $(GB, \varphi)$  in GB.

Theorem. Suppose that ZF is  $\omega$ -consistent. Let  $W$  be a recursively enumerable set of ZF-formulas such that, for every  $\varphi$ ,  $\varphi \in W$  implies  $Con(ZF, \varphi)$ . Then there is a  $\varphi$  such that  $\varphi \in \mathcal{I}_{ZF} - W$ . In fact, there is a primitive recursive function associating with every RE-formula  $\mathcal{V}(x)$  a formula  $\varphi$  such that, if  $W$  is the set numerated by  $\mathcal{V}(x)$  in ZF and if every element of  $W$  is a ZF-formula consistent with ZF, then  $\varphi \in \mathcal{I}_{ZF} - W$ .

Proof. Let  $W = \{n; (\exists m) A(m, n)\}$  where  $A$  is primitive recursive. Let  $\alpha(x, y)$  be a PR-formula

such that  $\alpha(x, y)$  bi-numerates  $A$  in ZF and

$\bigvee_x \alpha(x, y)$  numerates  $W$  in ZF. (Cf. [2] 3.11.)

Using the diagonal lemma 5.1 [2] we can construct a ZF-formula  $\varphi$  such that

$$ZF \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \bigwedge_x (\alpha(x, \bar{\varphi}) \rightarrow \neg \text{Con}_{\{ \bar{\varphi} \} \wedge x}).$$

(a)  $\text{Con}(ZF, \varphi)$ . Otherwise we have

$ZF \vdash \bigvee_x \alpha(x, \bar{\varphi})$  and therefore  $\varphi \in W$ , which implies  $\text{Con}(ZF, \varphi)$ .

(b)  $\varphi \notin W$ . Otherwise we have  $A(m, \varphi)$  for some  $m$ ; then  $ZF \vdash \alpha(\bar{m}, \bar{\varphi})$  and  $(ZF, \varphi) \vdash \neg \text{Con}_{\{ \bar{\varphi} \} \wedge \bar{m}}$ . But since  $(ZF, \varphi)$  is consistent and reflexive (see [2], p.89) we have  $(ZF, \varphi) \vdash \text{Con}_{\{ \bar{\varphi} \} \wedge \bar{m}}$  which contradicts the consistency of  $(ZF, \varphi)$ .

(c)  $\varphi \in J_{ZF}$ . We show  $ZF \vdash \text{Con}_{\{ \bar{\varphi} \} \wedge \bar{n}}$  for every  $n$ ; then  $\varphi \in J_{ZF}$  by Lemma 2. Since  $(ZF, \varphi) \vdash \text{Con}_{\{ \bar{\varphi} \} \wedge \bar{n}}$  by the reflexivity, it suffices to show  $(ZF, \neg \varphi) \vdash \text{Con}_{\{ \bar{\varphi} \} \wedge \bar{n}}$ . But  $\neg \varphi$  is equivalent in ZF to  $\bigvee_x (\alpha(x, \bar{\varphi}) \& \text{Con}_{\{ \bar{\varphi} \} \wedge x})$ . Now for each  $m$  we have  $ZF \vdash \neg \alpha(\bar{m}, \bar{\varphi})$  since  $\varphi \notin W$  by (b) and since  $\alpha$  bi-numerates  $A$  in ZF.

Hence we have

$$(ZF, \neg \varphi) \vdash \bigvee_x (x > \bar{m} \& \text{Con}_{\{ \bar{\varphi} \} \wedge x})$$

for each  $m$ , which implies  $(ZF, \neg \varphi) \vdash \text{Con}_{\{ \bar{\varphi} \} \wedge \bar{n}}$ . This completes the proof.

**Corollary 1.** If ZF is  $\omega$ -consistent then  $J_{ZF} - J_{GB} \neq \emptyset$ . For, evidently,  $\varphi \in J_{GB}$  implies  $\text{Con}(ZF, \varphi)$  and  $J_{GB}$  is recursively enumerable. (A formula  $\varphi$  belongs to  $J_{GB}$  iff there are two GB-formulas defining classes and membership in the sense of the interpretations and,

in addition, GB-proofs of the interpretations of all the finitely many - 15, say - axioms of  $(GB, \varphi)$ .

Corollary 2. Let  $GB_1$  be a consistent finitely axiomatized extension of GB (for example, by adding the axiom of existence of measurable cardinals, assuming that this extension is consistent). If ZF is  $\omega$ -consistent then  $\mathcal{I}_{ZF} - \mathcal{I}_{GB_1} \neq \emptyset$ .

Corollary 3. If ZF is  $\omega$ -consistent then  $\mathcal{I}_{ZF}$  is not recursively enumerable. (By the theorem, every recursively enumerable subset of  $\mathcal{I}_{ZF}$  is a proper subset.)

Discussion. (1) A historical remark. The Cohen's pioneering proof of the independence of the continuum hypothesis (CH) can be understood as a proof that, for every  $n$ ,  $ZF \vdash Con_{\mathcal{F} \cup \{\neg CH\} \wedge \pi}$  (see [1]) and therefore yields a relative interpretation of  $(ZF, \neg CH)$  in ZF. But it follows from our theorem that a relative interpretation of  $(ZF, \neg CH)$  in ZF does not automatically yield an interpretation of  $(GB, \neg CH)$  in GB. Such an interpretation was constructed in [8] by exploring the Cohen's proof (see also various relative interpretations of GB + additional axiom in GB constructed in [9] using the notion of Boolean valued models). It can be said that construction of a relative interpretation is the most natural kind of a relative consistency proof; but perhaps it is the matter of one's taste. (In fact, Vopěnka constructed a parametrical relative interpretation called a parametric syntactic model in [3]; but if  $(GB, \varphi)$  has a parametric relative interpretation in GB such that the range of parameters is described

by a ZF-formula, then  $(GB, \varphi)$  has a (non-parametric) relative interpretation in GB, see [3], Theorem 4.)

(2) Is  $\mathcal{I}_{GB} \subseteq \mathcal{I}_{ZF}$  ? It is true that if  $(GB, \varphi)$  has a "nice" relative interpretation in GB then  $\varphi \in \mathcal{I}_{ZF}$ . E.g. it suffices that  $M^*$  is absolute from below (i.e.  $GB \vdash M^*(X) \rightarrow M(X)$ ) and, in addition, both  $M^*(a)$  and  $M^*(a) \& M^*(b) \& a \in^* b$  are equivalent in GB to some ZF-formulas. (Here  $X$  is a class variable and  $a, b$  are set variables.) One can formulate more general conditions, but the problem in full generality seems to be open.

(3) By Lemma 2,  $\mathcal{I}_{ZF}$  is a  $\Pi_2^0$  set and by Corollary 3, it is not a  $\Sigma_1^0$  set. I do not know whether  $\mathcal{I}_{ZF}$  is a  $\Pi_1^0$  set and/or a  $\Delta_2^0$  set.

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Žitná 25

Praha 1

Československo

(Oblatum 8.10.1970)



